Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Johannes Meier
Introduction: European Challenges Call for European Responses . . . . . . . . . . 9

Ulrich Kober
The Radical Right in Europe: Challenges for Comparative Research . . . . . . . 13

Michael Minkenberg
Country Report Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Anton Pelinka
Country Report Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Mark Swyngedouw
Country Report Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Susi Meret
Country Report France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Jean-Yves Camus
Country Report Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Britta Schellenberg
Country Report Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Christopher T. Husbands
Country Report Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

József Bayer
Country Report Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

Juliane Wetzel
Country Report The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

Jaap van Donselaar, Willem Wagenaaar
Country Report Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

Heléne Lööw
Country Report Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463

Damir Skenderovic, Vera Sperisen
Dispersion and Differentiation: The Structures and Trends
of the Radical Right in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531

Britta Schellenberg
Strategies against the Radical Right in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547

Orkan Kösemen
Appendix: Abbreviations/Translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559

The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565


Foreword
Johannes Meier
The Canadian city of Toronto has a striking motto: “Diversity Is Our Strength.”
This attitude is indicative of the way communities with a long history of immigration
view diversity. Yet the motto is anything but common; in fact, it is remarkable.
Due to the rapid changes that have accompanied large movements of people across
borders in our lifetime, many countries with substantial levels of immigration are
experiencing significant social tensions. Integration is not easy or automatic; it is a
gradual process that requires financial and social investments, which tend to produce
long-term returns that are not immediately tangible. In his essay “E Pluribus
Unum: Diversity and Community in the 21st Century,” American social scientist
Robert D. Putnam presents important research showing how large-scale increases
in diversity within communities can initially have a negative impact on social cohesion.
According to Putnam, when large numbers of people enter a community to
settle within it, a new sense of community has to be generated in order for that
immigration to have a positive long-term impact upon the society. A new social
climate has to be established in which newcomers are not seen as a social threat
and are, instead, given a fair chance to become full members of the society they
have joined. Achieving a new climate is arduous—even for countries that have
promoted the social inclusion of newcomers over a relatively long period.
Europe has a long history of emigration to the New World and other parts of
the globe, and it was only in recent decades that it became a continent of integration.
The accompanying transformation in the collective consciousness of Europeans
has not yet fully taken hold across the old Continent. On the contrary, in many
parts of Europe, a backlash has been seen against globalization, social change and,
especially, immigration. In many European countries, social forces have emerged
that seek to mobilize the population to oppose immigration and the kind of profound
social changes it entails. This sentiment is often exploited by far-right populists
who are hostile to diversity and promote the myth of a homogeneous society as
the only possible basis for social harmony and cohesion. Far-right populist political
movements propagate this myth, as do right-wing extremists and the radical right.
Under the cloak of right-wing populist movements, anti-Semitism, racism and fascism
are re-emerging and growing stronger to the point that they pose a real threat
to pluralistic democracies in Europe.
Europe must address and oppose the threat of right-wing extremism. If it does
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not, issues such as diversity and immigration will polarize European societies and
will, indeed, weaken their social cohesion. The Bertelsmann Stiftung wants to make
a contribution to combating right-wing extremism in Europe. It has been working
to oppose right-wing extremism since the beginning of the 1990s, when it initiated
a number of projects promoting democracy, tolerance and solidarity. The Foundation’s
activities were a response to increased rates of violence against foreigners in
Germany following the country’s reunification. The Foundation implemented socalled
“Betzavta” training programs, which originated in Israel, were modified in
the United States and have been further developed by trainers for use in schools
and as part of extracurricular activities. These programs have proven very effective
at promoting tolerance and improving social cohesion among participants, who
further disseminate their learning within their communities. Additionally, the
Foundation’s project entitled “Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in
Germany” explored the role of the media, schools and early-childhood care in mobilizing
democratic societies against right-wing extremism. This project ended in 2006
and has been followed by the Foundation’s current project, which is called “Strategies
for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe.” With this new project, we
have broadened our focus beyond Germany to include the whole of Europe. The
Foundation’s current project addresses key questions, such as: What is the situation
concerning right-wing extremism like in other European countries? What strategies
can European governments learn from the policies of their neighbors to combat
right-wing extremism? What strategies are particularly effective, and which of these
may be transferable to the German context?
I would like to thank Ulrich Kober and Orkan Kösemen from the Bertelsmann
Stiftung’s Democracy and Integration Program, who worked closely with Britta
Schellenberg from the Center for Applied Policy Research (affiliated with the Ludwig
Maximilian University of Munich) in producing this book. I would also like to
thank all the authors for their high level of expertise and the important contribution
that each of them has made.
“Diversity Is Our Strength”—European countries would be well-advised to learn
from Toronto’s understanding of social cohesion. In order to achieve this, European
societies and policymakers must devise effective strategies for combating the threat
the far right poses to democracy in pluralistic societies. If they are to succeed, these
strategies must be courageous and resolute.
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Introduction: European Challenges
Call for European Responses
Ulrich Kober
In October 2008, a major public controversy erupted in the German city of Cologne
over plans to build a large new mosque. In fact, the dispute grew so fierce that the
arguments about it have reverberated throughout Europe. Plans by the Turkish-
Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), a mosque association, to build a highly
visible new mosque on the site of an older one met with strong resistance from
various quarters and sparked intense public debate. The issue became further inflamed
when a German radical right-wing party called Pro Köln (Pro Cologne)
sought to consolidate the scattered groups opposed to the building of the new
mosque.
The result was the formation of an alliance, or front, that united several disparate
groups with varying objections to the plans. Some groups argued that the building
was too big and would not fit into the city’s skyline, which is dominated by the
Dom, the city’s famous Gothic-style Roman Catholic cathedral. Others, including a
prominent Jewish intellectual, opposed the plans for the mosque on grounds of
principle, asserting that Islam was a religion of intolerance. Not surprisingly, Germany’s
established anti-immigrant groups also joined the Pro Köln front.
Pro Köln then used its representation on Cologne’s city council to stir up the
row into a Europe-wide controversy. It invited prominent far-right figures from all
over Europe, including representatives from Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, France’s
Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party to join in an anti-Islam demonstration
in central Cologne. Counter-demonstrations were organized against the
planned rally of the far-right groups, and the mayor of Cologne joined forces with
the mainstream political parties, trade unions, churches and other organizations to
block the gathering of rightists. Likewise, many of Cologne’s taxi drivers showed
their opposition to the far right’s rally by refusing to drive demonstrators into the
center of town, and anti-racist activists, including many young people, blocked the
roads leading to the venue. Finally, the local police announced a ban on the rightwing
rally to prevent violent clashes from breaking out between supporters of the
opposing sides.
The story of Pro Köln’s anti-mosque demonstration tells us a lot about the current
situation of right-wing extremism in Europe and about how it can be successfully
fought. It is a very complex and primarily nationalist phenomenon, yet it is a
growing force across Europe. Radical right-wing movements are fuelled by broader
9
anxieties and the profound social change that has occurred in nearly all European
countries. In recent decades, Europe has seen economic changes exacerbating social
tensions, cultural changes shattering old norms and ideologies, demographic
changes and increased immigration.
Scapegoat ideologies flourish in times of rapid change and social insecurity.
Immigrants—particularly those with Muslim backgrounds—have frequently become
targets of latent xenophobia in European societies. Likewise, right-wing extremists
who champion myths of national homogeneity seek to take advantage of
growing anxieties. They often unite with other right-wing populists on the radical
right, and the resulting far-right movements have become a threat to all liberal
European societies.
The growing self-confidence of various far-right groups at the European level is
demonstrated by their efforts to join forces in the European Parliament. The first
pan-European meeting of far-right political groups, which was initiated by the Austrian
Freedom Party, took place in November 2005. Then, in January 2007, rightwing
extremist parties in the European Parliament formed a faction called Identity,
Tradition and Sovereignty. This new parliamentary group was made up of Belgium’s
Vlaams Belang, France’s Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, an independent
MEP from Great Britain, Italy’s Social Alternative party (led by Alessandra
Mussolini, granddaughter of the fascist dictator), and the Tricolor Flame Social
Movement. In addition, two parties from Eastern Europe—Bulgaria’s National Union
Attack and Romania’s Greater Romania Party—became members of the faction.
However, less than a year later, in November 2007, this rightist alliance in the
European Parliament was disbanded owing to ideological contradictions within its
own ranks. The Italian neo-fascists insulted the Romanian members by calling Romanians
congenitally criminal, which led the Romanian MEPs to quit the parliamentary
group. However, with the next European election scheduled for June 2009,
it is likely that the far-right will once again try to create a pan-European extreme
right-wing faction in the European Parliament.
Some may argue that the danger right-wing extremism poses to European democracies
is still negligible. However, if the radical right gains momentum as part
of a backlash against the forces of modernization and globalization, Europe should
not underestimate the continued threat it represents. Further modernization and
globalization will certainly be an integral part of the future of the old Continent. As
a result, it is necessary to carefully analyze and monitor the various far-right movements
in Europe and within its member states. European societies and democracies
must engage in a sustained dialogue on how to effectively combat right-wing extremism.
As the European community becomes more unified, sharing knowledge
about existing strategies for combating far-right radicalism is increasingly important.
This volume can be a contribution to creating long-term dialogue for addressing
the challenges of right-wing extremism.
The first part of this volume sets out a conceptual framework for understanding
the current landscape of the political far right in Europe. Michael Minkenberg, one
10
of the leading comparative thinkers on this issue, proposes a broad concept of the
radical right based on a modernization-theoretical argument according to which
right-wing extremism is interpreted as a radical attempt to fight social change and
modernization. As a political ideology, it is characterized by the myth of a homogenous
nation as well as a romantic and populist ultranationalism that is directed
against the concept of liberal, pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of
individualism and universalism.
The second part of this volume contains an analysis of right-wing extremism in
11 European countries. These countries were selected to provide the reader with a
comparison of right-wing extremism in countries with diverse political systems and
immigration policies. Austria, Germany and Switzerland are “consensus democracies”
with many political checks and balances as well as restrictive immigration
policies. Belgium and the Netherlands are in the same category of consensus democracies,
but they pursue different immigration policies. In contrast, the study
also examines Great Britain and France, both of which have majoritarian political
systems. Still, these two countries differ markedly in their immigration policies:
Whereas Great Britain’s are considered moderate, France’s are seen as open. Denmark,
Italy and Sweden have “mixed democratic systems” in which the executive is
restricted to a certain degree by political or institutional factors. Nevertheless, each
of the three employs a different immigration policy. Denmark’s is considered restrictive,
Italy’s moderate, and Sweden’s open. Altogether, this 11-country analysis
provides the reader with diverse country cases in which both immigration regulations
and the number of political actors influencing parliamentary decisions vary.
Both factors have an impact on how right-wing extremism is addressed by mainstream
politics and society.
The 11 country reports follow a single template, which facilitates a comparative
study. The authors of each report analyze the radical right in terms of their history,
actors, main traits, socio-political environment and perspectives. The reports focus
on how the selected countries are combating right-wing radicalism at the national
level. Thus, the evaluation of strategies to combat the radical right addresses, first,
the legal order and law enforcement, second, the political actors and institutions,
and, third, civil society. Each of these three sections contains a review of good
practice and a strategic outlook. The third part of this volume summarizes its findings
regarding policy trends and strategies for combating right-wing radicalism.
Although this volume examines how these strategies have worked at the national
level, we hope that it might serve as a stimulus for designing strategies against
right-wing extremism at the European level. The spread of extremist and xenophobic
attitudes and the proliferation of radical right-wing political movements are
challenges confronting all of Europe. The European Union must respond in a concerted
way to right-wing extremism because European challenges call for European
responses. It is not enough to merely protect minorities or fight xenophobia and
racism. What is at stake here is democratic values across Europe and the vitality of
its pluralist democracies.
11
The city of Cologne has shown that it understands the true nature of the challenge
from the radical right by standing up to the far right in October 2008. Cologne
has successfully responded to right-wing extremism. EU member states and the
European community should do the same.
12